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The Hazards of Tinkering with the
Common Law of Future Interests: The
California Experience
by
LAURA E. CuNNiNGHAm*
Introduction
Because of their enormous flexibility, trusts are extremely useful
estate planning tools. By means of a trust, a donor can divide prop-
erty temporally among multiple beneficiaries, and thus create succes-
sive interests in trust property, while legal title remains in but one
party, the trustee.' Thus, for example, if Ophelia wishes to ensure
that certain property will ultimately be available for her grandchild
Ben, but wishes to provide support for her child Adam throughout his
life, she can transfer title2 to the property to a trustee under the terms
of a trust providing income to Adam for life, remainder to Ben. Sup-
pose Ophelia creates such a trust, and that Ben dies during Adam's
lifetime. Who is entitled to the trust property when Adam dies? This
* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva Uni-
versity. The author gratefully acknowledges the advice and comments of Noel Cunning-
ham, Jesse Dukeminier, Melanie Leslie, Stephen A. Lind, Melvin H. Morgan, Stewart
Sterk, and the research assistance of Marc Yassinger, J.D. Candidate, Hastings College of
the Law, 1997.
1. Although successive interests in specific property can also be created through the
use of legal life estates, they are far less common than trusts. The fact that legal title can be
held in but one person, the trustee, throughout the existence of the successive interests
makes the trust vehicle the preferred one. The discussion in this Article will be limited to
successive interests in trusts.
2. The trust can be inter vivos or testamentary. The term "testamentary trust" gen-
erally refers to one created by the trustor's will. Although some of the doctrines discussed
in this Article apply only to testamentary trusts, the trend in the law has been to apply the
same rules to both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. For present purposes, assume the
trust is created by Ophelia's will.
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apparently simple question has generated a surprising amount of liti-
gation and controversy.3
Because Ophelia's trust fails to expressly state whether Ben must
survive Adam in order to receive his interest, it will be up to a court to
construe the trust in an effort to discern and carry out Ophelia's unex-
pressed intent in that regard. The common law developed a default
rule which required the court to construe the trust utilizing a construc-
tional preference for vested remainders. 4 Applying that default rule,
Ben's remainder interest is considered vested and transmissible5 by
him, rather than contingent on Ben's survival of Adam. Application
of the common law default rule means that the remainder interest is
part of Ben's estate (for tax and probate purposes), and will pass as
Ben directs by will (or to his heirs if he dies intestate). Although this
result may be completely consistent with Ophelia's intent, it may not
be optimal: probating the interest in Ben's estate is awkward, poten-
tially expensive, and may result in an unnecessary estate tax burden.
Thus, the attentive estate planner would draft the trust in such a way
as to express Ophelia's intent concerning ultimate disposition of the
property and to achieve the optimal probate and tax results.6 The
controversy surrounding this issue is, however, testimony to the fact
that not all estate planners are as attentive as they should be.
The constructional preference for vested remainders has been
portrayed by commentators as a relic of the past, and an aspect of the
law of trusts and estates ripe for reform. While some have criticized
3. In 1961, Professor Halbach described the question of whether a remainder benefi-
ciary must survive to the time of possession as "probably the most litigated question in the
law of future interests." Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Future Interests: Express and Implied
Conditions of Survival (pts. I & II), 49 CAL. L. REv. 297,431 (1961) [hereinafter Halbach,
Future Interests]. See generally Verner F. Chaffin, Descendible Future Interests in Georgia:
The Effect of the Preference for Early Vesting, 7 GA. L. Rnv. 443 (1973); Susan F. French,
Imposing a General Survival Requirement on Beneficiaries of Future Interests: Solving the
Problems Caused by the Death of a Beneficiary Before the Tune Set for Distribution, 27
ARiz. L. REv. 801 (1985); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Issues About Issue: Some Recurrent
Class Gift Problems, 48 Mo. L. REv. 333 (1983); Edward C. Halbach Jr. & Lawrence W.
Waggoner, The UPC's New Survivorship and Antilapse Provisions, 55 ALB. L. REv. 1091
(1992); Edward H. Rabin, The Law Favors the Vesting of Estates. Why?, 65 COLUM. L.
Rv. 467 (1965); Daniel M. Schuyler, Drafting, Tax and Other Consequences of the Rule of
Early Vesting, 46 U. ILL. L. REv. 407 (1951).
4. 5 AMERiCAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 21.3 (A.J. Casner ed., 1952); L. SIMEs & A.
SMrrH, THE LAW OF FuTuRE INrmRs § 573 (2d ed. 1956).
5. The term "transmissible" is generally used to describe an indefeasibly vested re-
mainder over which the beneficiary has testamentary power. It is so used in this Article.
6. For example, Ben could have been given a non-general power of appointment
over the property in the event he predeceased Adam, and a substitute taker, for example,
Ben's heirs, could have been named to take in the event Ben failed to survive Adam.
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the rule and have warned drafters to avoid it,7 others have argued that
the common law rule favoring vested remainders should be replaced
with a statutory scheme which essentially rewrites poorly written trust
instruments, in an attempt to achieve the "optimal" probate and tax
result for each trust.8 The proposed statutory solutions not only at-
tempt to effectuate donor intent, but to effectuate the intent of a do-
nor who was fully informed in tax and probate law.
Prior to the 1980s, only a handful of states had adopted limited
versions of a delayed vesting rule.9 In 1983, the California legislature
was the first in the country to enact a sweeping version of a delayed
vesting statute, although that statute never became effective.10 Yet
advocates of delayed vesting achieved a major victory with the issu-
ance of the 1990 revision of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) con-
taining section 2-707, which would essentially redraft the language of
Ophelia's trust to read as follows: "Income to Adam for life, remain-
der to Ben if Ben survives Adam, and if Ben does not survive Adam,
then to Ben's issue, if any, and if none then to the residuary benefi-
ciaries of Ophelia's estate, and if none then to Ophelia's heirs."'1
Seven states have already adopted this provision.' 2
This Article demonstrates the dangers inherent in replacing long-
standing common law doctrines regarding construction of trust instru-
ments with statutory rules (like UPC section 2-707) which reach dra-
matically different results. Because such rules rewrite attorney-drawn
instruments in a revolutionary manner, their enactment should be
supported by a compelling justification, and should be done carefully.
As a pioneer in this area, California has not set a good example.
The primary focus of this Article is on California law: Has the
constructional preference for vested remainders survived the Probate
Code reform of the 1980s and 1990s? It demonstrates that the Cali-
fornia statute is ambiguous on this point, and that the ambiguities re-
sult from an unsuccessful attempt to eliminate the preference for
vested remainders.
In 1983, the California legislature enacted a major revision of the
Probate Code, including a provision that abandoned the common law
7. Schuyler, supra note 3, at 436-40; Chaffin, supra note 3, at 490.
8. French, supra note 3; Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 3.
9. Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee each had statutes in place which implied a
survival condition only on class gifts. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 514-11 (Smith-Hurd
1996); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2514(5) (1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-3-104 (1984).
10. See discussion infra Part I.
11. UMr. PROB. CODE § 2-707 (West 1990), discussed in detail infra Part IV.
12. See infra note 37.
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presumption of early vesting in favor of a constructional preference
for delayed vesting.13 The effective date of the revised code was
delayed until 1985.14 In the meantime, the legislature repealed the
delayed vesting rule and revised the Probate Code yet again to re-
establish a preference for early vesting except as applied to a rela-
tively narrow type of future interests.' 5 Yet the remedial legislation
removed only the most obvious statements of the preference for
delayed vesting, leaving in place statutory language which was origi-
nally drafted to coordinate with that preference. That statutory lan-
guage, particularly when coupled with the legislative history, created
ambiguities in the law as to the proper treatment of future interests
created by will. The problem was compounded in 1994, when the
State Bar naively recommended that the rules be made applicable to
all donative transfers, whether by deed, trust, or will. 6 Thus, rules
that were troublesome in the context of wills became applicable to
wills, trusts, deeds, and all other instruments making donative trans-
fers. The results in some instances are absurd.
As a consequence of the California legislature's enactment and
attempted repeal of a delayed vesting rule, the California statutes gov-
erning the construction of wills and trusts are virtually impossible to
comprehend, and a mine field for estate planners to navigate. This
has been accomplished in the name of reform, of furthering the intent
of the testator, and limiting the instances of malpractice. Instead, the
resulting law places a larger premium than ever on careful drafting to
explicitly state the testator's intent, for the failure to do so may result
in dispositions that create unanticipated tax consequences, run con-
trary to the drafter's intent, and violate established principles of future
interest law.
This Article exposes and attempts to resolve the severe problems
in California law, in part as a warning to other states considering join-
ing the delayed vesting bandwagon: they should proceed with caution.
After a brief description of the debate over vested versus contingent
remainders in Part I, it traces the developments in California law re-
garding the construction of wills and trusts, beginning with pre-1983
law and ending with the most recent revisions of 1994, in an effort to
comprehend the present state of the law. This Article focuses on the
two most troublesome aspects of present law.
13. 1983 Cal. Stat. 842.
14. Id. § 58.
15. 1984 Cal. Stat. 892 § 28.
16. See infra Part IIL
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In Part II, I demonstrate that current California law does not im-
ply a survivorship condition upon future interests, except in the case
of a class gift to a class such as "heirs," "descendants," or a similarly
described class. Although the legislature did enact an implied condi-
tion of survivorship, it repealed the requirement prior to the time it
was scheduled to become effective, and the rule never became a part
of California law. Yet the amendments repealing the requirement
were constructed so poorly that the statute could still be read to imply
a survivorship requirement. Thus, those ambiguities in the Probate
Code that leave room for interpreting the law to encompass such a
rule should be eliminated. The danger in not doing so is that, given
the current statute, the door is open for an unwitting court to adopt a
survivorship requirement, and the dangers lurking in that interpreta-
tion are enormous.
In Part III, I then illustrate the problems of extending the Pro-
bate Code rules, which were originally drafted to apply to interests
conveyed by will, to all donative instruments. Although there may be
sound reasons for rules that interpret wills and will substitutes consist-
ently, applying those rules in blanket fashion to instruments creating
outright gifts, such as irrevocable trusts and deeds, creates not only
absurd results, but also major transfer tax problems.
Finally, I address the broader question that all states considering
adoption of UPC section 2-707 must consider: should the common law
of future interests be replaced by statutory rules that rewrite trust in-
struments to impose survivorship conditions where none are explicitly
stated? Supporters of UPC section 2-707 have portrayed its rules as
achieving a "best of all worlds" result that effectuates donor intent
while obtaining optimal transfer tax and probate results. 17 In fact,
there is no consensus that it is more likely to effectuate donor intent
than the common law; it clearly does not achieve optimal tax results in
all cases; and the probate problems it seeks to solve may not even
exist, or at least could be solved in a less drastic fashion. For the rea-
sons discussed in Part IV of this Article, I conclude that adoption of
UPC section 2-707 is unnecessary and unjustified.
17. See generally Halbach &Waggoner, supra note 3.
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I. The Debate over Implied Conditions of Survival
In the absence of an express requirement 8 that the beneficiary of
a remainder interest survive until the time her interest becomes pos-
sessory, should such a requirement be implied? This seemingly arcane
question has become increasingly controversial. The tax and probate
consequences of construing a remainder as indefeasibly vested (and
hence "transmissible") or as subject to a condition of survival are dra-
matically different, and for that reason, the careful attorney will draft
the instrument to achieve the type of interest desired.
A. RTansmissible Remainders
Recall the example of Ophelia's trust, granting "income to Adam
for life, remainder to Ben." If Ben's remainder is construed to be
indefeasibly vested at the time that the trust is created, it will be trans-
missible by him at death. As a result, it will be included in his probate
estate as well as in his gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. As
a probate asset, it will be subject to the attendant fees and other disad-
vantages of probate administration. If Ben's executor neglects to in-
clude the remainder in Ben's probate estate, it may be necessary to
reopen Ben's probate estate when Adam dies in order to obtain a
decree of distribution. 19 Inclusion of the remainder in Ben's estate for
federal estate tax purposes may subject it to an estate tax burden. If
Ben's taxable estate, including the remainder interest, exceeds
$600,000, then an estate tax will be imposed. 20 Note, however, that if
Ben's will leaves the remainder to his spouse, any estate tax burden on
the remainder will be postponed until the death of the spouse because
of the estate tax marital deduction.21
18. It is essential to note at the outset that the rules of construction discussed here are
default rules which apply only in the absence of a clear and unequivocal expression of the
transferor's intent. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21102 (West 1997).
19. See French, supra note 3, at 804. In some cases, however, where the deceased
beneficiary's executor neglected to include the remainder in the probate estate, a court
may be willing to direct distribution directly to the persons who are entitled to receive it
without reopening the estate, thus avoiding probate costs entirely. See, e.g., Security Trust
Co. v. Irvine, 93 A.2d 528, 532 (Del. Ch. 1953). See also JEssE DuEMIamR & STANLEY
M. JoHANsoN, WELLs, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 711 (5th ed. 1995) (noting that there is little
empirical evidence to confirm that increased costs result from inclusion of transmissible
remainders in probate estates).
20. I.R.C. § 2010 (West 1997).
21. I.R.C. § 2056(a) (West 1997). The careful drafter who wanted to preserve Ben's
(B) share of the estate for his family and avoid estate taxation would have specified that
B's spouse and/or issue should take if B fails to survive, or would have given B a non-
general power to appoint the property, with his heirs or issue as takers in default of ap-
pointment. Note, however, as discussed below, that a careful drafter might have desired
[Vol. 48
April 1997] THE HAZARDS OF TINKERING WITH FUTURE INTERESTS 673
B. Contingent Remainders
If the language of the trust is construed to require Ben to survive
until Adam's death in order for Ben to receive his interest, Ben will
possess a contingent remainder that will not pass through Ben's pro-
bate estate, nor be subject to federal estate tax at Ben's death. 2 How-
ever, because the trust fails to name an alternate taker, the trust
property will revert to the trustor. Thus, in the above example the
trust property would revert to Ophelia's estate, which could require
the reopening of Ophelia's probate estate, perhaps many years after
her death. Most significantly, if the remainder is construed as contin-
gent, then Ben lacks the power to direct who will take the property
upon his death.
California has historically followed the majority common law
view, which disfavors implying a survival condition, while favoring a
constructional preference for vested remainders.23 In most cases, in-
cluding those involving gifts to specifically defined classes such as chil-
dren, California courts have historically relied upon the former
Probate Code section 28 preference for early vesting in declining to
imply a condition of survival.24 Although the preference for early
vesting has its origins in early property law,z the primary modern jus-
tification offered for this result is that it is more likely to conform to
the testator's probable intent by preserving equality of distribution
among lines of descent.26 To illustrate, consider the example above.
Ophelia failed to specify what happens to Ben's remainder should he
fail to survive Adam. If Ben died leaving a spouse and children, the
preference for vested remainders presumes it is more likely that
that the remainder be included in B's estate for estate tax purposes in order to avoid the
generation-skipping transfer tax.
22. I.RC. § 2033 (West 1997). Because Ben's interest terminates with his death, it
will not be an asset of his gross estate.
23. Halbach, Future Interests, supra note 3, at 302-04.
24. One exception recognized in some jurisdictions is where the gift of the remainder
is to a vaguely defined class such as "heirs" or "family," where the courts have been willing
to imply that the testator intended to limit the class to those living at the time possession of
the interest occurs. See Rabin, supra note 3, at 476-78. California courts have not em-
braced that exception. See Halbach, Future Interests, supra note 3, at 315-20; see also Es-
tate of Woodworth, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 676, 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (applying the rule of
early vesting to find that the determination of heirs must take place at the death of the
named ancestor rather than at the time of enjoyment of the interest). The result in Wood-
worth was changed by statute with the 1983 Probate Code revisions. See discussion infra
Part II.
25. The historic justifications for the rule are discussed at length in Schuyler, supra
note 3, at 408-27.
26. See Rabin, supra note 3, at 483-86.
Ophelia would prefer that Ben's family share in the estate rather than
being cut out entirely, which would likely occur should the remainder
revert to Ophelia's estate and pass under the residuary clause of her
will. Thus, the majority common law approach, followed in Califor-
nia, is that Ben's remainder will be treated as vested at the time of
creation of the trust (at Ophelia's death if the trust is contained in
Ophelia's will), and will therefore pass as Ben directs by his will.27
The common law solution is not flexible enough to achieve opti-
mal probate and tax consequences. A court construing the language
"income to Adam, remainder to Ben" has limited options: it can de-
termine the interest vested and is transmissible by Ben (resulting in
the probate and tax consequences discussed above) or it can imply a
survival condition, which would result in the failure of the interest.
When the interest fails it must then pass back to Ophelia's estate, to
be distributed under the residuary clause of her will. Given a choice
between these two extremes, the preference for vested remainders has
retained its vitality.28
Yet dissatisfaction with the probate and tax results of characteriz-
ing a remainder as transmissible has led some commentators to advo-
cate a statutory solution that would protect Ben's issue from
disinheritance, but not subject the remainder to probate in Ben's es-
tate or inclusion in his taxable estate.29 In the most comprehensive
article on the subject, Professor French provided an exhaustive discus-
sion of the alternatives available to legislatures in addressing this
problem.30 One possibility she discussed is extending the principles of
27. This result was approved by Professor Halbach:
If a testator (or settlor of a living trust) has selected a particular person to receive
some interest in his property and has thought no further than that selection, it
seems preferable to allow the rights to vest and to let that beneficiary's own
desires take effect where the testator's desires are unknown. Since the benefici-
ary in question is the only person known to have been intended to receive the
property, he could at least be given the benefit of deciding who will take the
interest in his place.
Halbach, Future Interests, supra note 3, at 305.
28. Professor Halbach described the principle of early vesting as "a fundamental co-
hesive force which fosters predictability and usually leads to desirable results." Id at 328.
Professor Rabin, although critical of a wooden application of the rule, noted that the rule's
tendency to protect issue of deceased remaindermen is the rule's "principal raison d'etre."
Rabin, supra note 3, at 484.
29. See Rabin, supra note 3, at 487 ("It might well be preferable to protect the issue of
deceased remaindermen by legislation, rather than by the rule favoring vesting."). See
generally French, supra note 3.
30. See generally French, supra note 3.
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anti-lapse statutes to future interests.3 1 Typical anti-lapse statutes, in-
cluding California's,32 protect a bequest by will to a person who has
predeceased the testator by substituting the beneficiary's issue. The
statutes will normally apply only if there is some relationship between
the testator and the beneficiary. For example, the California statute
will apply if the deceased beneficiary was kindred 33 to the testator or
to the testator's spouse.34 As applied to the future interest created by
Ophelia's will, the anti-lapse solution would substitute Ben's issue in
his place.
Professor French advocated a much more sophisticated solution:
implication of a survivorship requirement on beneficiaries of future
interests, accompanied by an implied non-general power in the benefi-
ciary to appoint the assets among some class of beneficiaries. 35 The
eligible takers may include issue only, or heirs only, or any persons, so
long as the power excludes the beneficiary's estate, her creditors, and
the creditors of her estate. In essence, Professor French's solution
would rewrite the trust instrument to include language which most
estate planners would have included had they desired to: (i) avoid es-
tate taxation in the remainderman's estate; (ii) avoid probate of the
remainder interest in the deceased beneficiary's estate; and (iii) give
the beneficiary the power to determine to whom the future interest
would ultimately pass. Thus, a trust that reads only "income to Adam
for life, remainder to Ben," might be rewritten by the legislature to
read "income to Adam for life, remainder to Ben if he survives Adam,
and if he does not, then to those persons whom Ben shall appoint by
will, solely excluding Ben, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of
his estate, and if Ben shall fail to so appoint, then to Ben's heirs at
law, determined as of the time of Ben's death."
To date, those states that have enacted survivorship statutes have
followed the anti-lapse model. Prior to 1983, when the California law
reform took place, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee had statutes
implying survivorship conditions, with substitute gifts in issue, in lim-
31. Id. at 813-15.
32. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21110 (West 1997).
33. Kindred describes a relationship by blood or consanguinity. BLAcK's LAw Dic-
TONARY 871 (6th ed. 1990).
34. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21110 (West 1997).
35. French, supra note 3, at 835-36. Internal Revenue Code section 2041 imposes
estate tax liability with respect to the value of property that is subject to a general power of
appointment. A general power of appointment is defined as a power that can be exercised
in favor of the holder of the power, her estate, her creditors, or creditors of the estate.
I.RC. § 2041(b)(1) (West 1997).
ited circumstances.36 As discussed below, California briefly enacted a
similar rule, and most recently, the 1990 revisions of the Uniform Pro-
bate Code added UPC section 2-707, which provides that absent a
contrary intent, "[a] future interest under the terms of a trust is con-
tingent on the beneficiary's surviving the distribution date." The stat-
ute goes on to imply a substitute gift to the beneficiary's issue, if any,
and if none, then to the beneficiaries under the residuary clause of the
trustor's will, and if none, or if the trust was contained in the residuary
clause, then to the trustor's heirs. Unlike traditional anti-lapse stat-
utes, UPC section 2-707 implies the substitute gift regardless of the
relationship between the trustor and the beneficiary. Seven states
have adopted this provision.37
Although UPC section 2-707 may be viewed as accomplishing a
"best of all worlds" result, it is not without its problems, and has been
subject to sharp criticism. 38 It preserves equality of distribution
among lines of descent, but it eliminates the deceased beneficiary's
ability to direct distribution of the remainder if he either has no issue
or wishes the property to pass to someone other than issue, such as his
spouse. Thus, the provision has been criticized for reducing rather
than increasing flexibility in estate planning.39
Even when the beneficiary's will would have left the remainder to
his or her issue, the statute achieves markedly different results than if
the remainder had been transmissible. The remainder will not be in-
cluded in the deceased beneficiary's taxable estate for federal estate
tax purposes, but it may be subject to the potentially higher tax on
generation-skipping transfers.40 And while UPC section 2-707 ensures
that the interest passes to the deceased beneficiary's issue, it will pass
outright and free of trust. If the issue are minors, it will be necessary
36. The Pennsylvania and Tennessee statutes apply only to class gifts. 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2514(5) (1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-3-104 (1984). The Illinois statute
applies to future interests generally, but contains an exception for indefeasibly vested re-
mainders, which substantially narrows its reach. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 5/4-11
(Smith-Hurd 1996).
37. ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.707 (1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2707 (1996);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-707 (West 1996); HAw. REv. STAT. § 560:2-707 (1996);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-717 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-707 (Michie 1996); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-07 (1995).
38. See generally Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Probate Code Upends the Law of
Remainders, 94 MIcH. L. REv. 148 (1995).
39. Id. at 150.
40. The federal estate tax is imposed under a progressive rate structure, which essen-
tially begins at 37% and runs to 55%. The tax on generation-skipping transfers is imposed
at the maximum estate tax rate of 55%. LR.C. §§ 2001, 2010 (West 1997). See discussion
infra Part IV.
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to establish a guardianship to manage the funds, whereas the benefici-
ary's will could leave the property in further trust.
The problems inherent in UPC section 2-707 are discussed in de-
tail in Part IV. The following section focuses on California law, where
the legislature has not adopted the provision. However, in 1983, the
California legislature did adopt a remedial future interest statute in
the anti-lapse model, but it repealed that provision before it became
effective. It appears that the California Law Revision Commission
tested the waters and found them too cold. But in the process, the
clarity of prior law gave way to the muddied waters of present law.
I. Does California Imply a Survivorship Requirement?
A. An Introductory Exercise
A law school Wils and Trusts class is asked to answer the follow-
ing question, applying California law:
T's will leaves her estate in trust for the benefit of A for life, remain-
der to A's children. When T writes the will, A has three children, B,
C, and D, all of whom are still living at T's death. B predeceases A,
leaving all of his estate to his widow, W. He is survived by his
widow and two children, X and Y. To whom should the trustee dis-
tribute the trust when A dies, survived by C, D, W, X, and Y?
(1) Pre-Reform Law
If the question were asked prior to 1983, it could be easily an-
swered by reference to the California statute and the well-established
common law of future interests.
No property interest is created in the beneficiaries of T's will until
her death, at which point two separate interests are created. The
first is an income interest in A, a so-called "present interest." The
second is a future interest: a remainder interest in A's children who
are living at T's death. These interests are vested at T's death.41
B's remainder vested, but because it is part of a gift to a class
consisting of A's "children," and A might still have children prior to
death, the interest of each member of the class is subject to reduction
in the event more members join the class prior to the time the interest
becomes possessory.42
41. Former California Probate Code section 28 provided: "Testamentary dispositions,
including devises and bequests to a person on attaining majority, are presumed to vest at
the testator's death." CAL. PROB. CODE § 28 (West 1982) (repealed 1983).
42. Former California Probate Code section 123 stated the common law "rule of con-
venience" for determining when to cut off the opportunity for additional members to join
the class:
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B's vested remainder is transmissible, which means that he has
the power to decide to whom it will pass upon his death. Thus, B's
interest will pass to W under the terms of his will.43
In sum, California common law followed the majority rule favor-
ing vested remainders. The effect was to completely divest T of the
property at 2's death. Ultimate disposition of the property would de-
pend on B, and in no event would the property revert to T.
(2) Post-Reform Law
If that same question were asked in 1996, the answer would be far
less clear, for the following reasons. Probate Code section 21109(a)
states: "A transferee who fails to survive the transferor or until any
future time required by the instrument does not take under the instru-
ment." Does this mean, the student asks, that B must survive until A's
death in order to take under the will? The will does not explicitly
require that B survive until A's death, so the answer is probably no.
But what does the "future time" language mean?
Probate Code section 21110(a) states:
[]f a transferee... fails to survive the transferor or until a future
time required by the instrument, the issue of the deceased trans-
feree take in the transferee's place.... A transferee under a class
gift shall be a transferee for the purpose of this subdivision unless
the transferee's death occurred before the execution of the instru-
ment and that fact was known to the transferor when the instrument
was executed. 44
Subsection (c) states: "As used in this section, 'transferee' means a
person who is kindred of the transferor or kindred of a surviving, de-
ceased or former spouse of the transferor." 45 If the student decides
that section 21109 requires B to survive until A's death, then does
section 21110 mean that X and Y, the issue of B, are entitled to take
B's interest, rather than W, as under prior law, but only if B is "kin-
dred" to 7? But again, because the document does not explicitly re-
quire that B survive until A's death, perhaps section 21110 does not
A testamentary disposition to a class includes every person answering the descrip-
tion at the testator's death; but when possession is postponed to a future period, it
includes also all persons coming within the description before the time to which
possession is postponed. A child conceived before but born after a testator's
death, or any other period when a disposition to a class vests in right or in posses-
sion, takes, if answering to the description of the class.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 123 (West 1982) (repealed 1983).
43. See In re Stanford's Estate, 315 P.2d 681 (Cal. 1957), discussed in Halbach, Future
Interests, supra note 3, at 308-11.
44. CA.. PROB. CODE § 21110(a) (West 1997).
45. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21110(c) (West 1997).
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apply, and absent such a requirement, it will never apply to a gift of a
future interest to a class. If that is the case, what is the meaning of the
reference to a "future time" in section 21110?
Probate Code section 21113(b) states: "A transfer of a future in-
terest to a class includes all persons answering the class description at
the time the transfer is to take effect in enjoyment. '46 The clear impli-
cation of subsection (b) is that even if the student decides that section
21109 does not impose a survivorship requirement upon all takers of
future interests, if that interest is given to a class, survivorship until
the time of possession is required. The result is unclear. Does B's
interest fail, and pass to C and D, as the two members of the class who
have survived to the time of possession? Or is B's interest saved by
the anti-lapse statute of section 21110, and passed to B's issue? If the
"future time" language of section 21110 only applies to express re-
quirements in the instrument, so that it does not apply here, then it
would seem that there is no room to apply the anti-lapse statute here
either. It would appear instead that B's interest in the trust may pass
to C and D. In no case will it pass under the terms of his will to W, as
it did under prior law.
Probate Code section 21116 states: "A testamentary disposition
by an instrument, including a transfer to a person on attaining major-
ity, is presumed to vest at the transferor's death."47 This statute,
which is substantially the same as former Probate Code section 28,
would appear to indicate that B's remainder interest vested at the
time of Y's death and should pass under the terms of his will, the same
answer that was reached (albeit more quickly) under pre-1983 law. If
that is the case, then what is the meaning of sections 21109 through
21113?
iis exercise illustrates the numerous problems that one en-
counters in attempting to negotiate the revised sections of the Probate
Code governing the construction of instruments. As a practical mat-
ter, finding the "correct" answer will be of great interest to C, D, W,
X, and Y, to the Internal Revenue Service, and to T's attorney, who
more likely than not drafted the will with full confidence that the pre-
1983 result would invariably be the correct one, and who may be held
responsible to W should she be proven incorrect. As an academic
matter, the exercise illustrates the stresses that a poorly written statute
can place on the legal system (let alone on law students).
46. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21113(b) (West 1997).
47. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21116 (West 1997).
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For the reasons described below, however, the answer to the
question posed earlier should be the same under post- and pre-reform
law: B's remainder vested at Y's death, although his share was subject
to reduction in the event A had more children. On B's death, his
share will pass under the terms of his will to W, who will be entitled to
possession when A dies. The answer, however, is not at all self-evi-
dent, and there is a substantial risk that a court interpreting the statute
might reach a different conclusion. In fact, in Estate of Woodworth,48
the California Court of Appeal, in dicta, did just that. In Woodworth,
the testator left a portion of his estate in trust for the benefit of his
wife for life, remainder to the testator's sister if she was living at the
wife's death, and if not, then to the sister's "heirs at law."49 The testa-
tor died in 1971, his sister died in 1980, and his wife died in 1991.50
The question before the court was the relevant date for determining
the identity of the sister's heirs: was it 1980 or 1991?51 The sister's
husband (or the beneficiaries of his will, because he died in 1988)
would be included in the class were the relevant date 1980, whereas he
would not be included if the correct time for ascertaining the class
were 1991, when the remainder became possessory.
Applying pre-reform law, the Court of Appeal found that the
common law preference for early vesting of remainder interests dic-
tated that the heirs of the sister should be determined at the time of
her death.52 Thus, the beneficiaries of the husband's will (including
the University of California) were entitled to share in the estate. The
court noted, however, that the result would be different under post-
reform law:
It is undisputed that had the testator in this case died on or after
January 1, 1985, the Regents would have no claim to the trust assets.
Under Probate Code sections [21113] and [21114], which have been
in effect since 1985, a devise of a future interest to a class, such as
heirs, includes only those who fit the class description at the time
the legacy is to take effect in enjoyment.53
48. 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
49. d. at 677.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 678.
52. Id. at 681. As discussed supra in note 24, some jurisdictions have recognized an
exception to the delayed vesting rule in these circumstances. One can see the benefit of
applying the exception here, because the earlier determination of the sister's heirs in-
creased the likelihood that the property would pass to strangers whom the testator had
clearly not intended to benefit. The exception is now part of California law due to the
enactment of the predecessor to Probate Code section 21114.
53. 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 679 n.3.
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Although the court's dictum is correct under section 21114,54 the fact
that it also found support for that conclusion in section 21113 is troub-
lesome: the court seems to have believed it clear that section 21113
also requires survival until the time of possession. That court, it would
appear, would find that, under our facts, B's interest fails, and passes
to C and D.
Reading section 21113 to encompass an implied survivorship con-
dition leads one to an entirely different result than that reached under
California law prior to 1985. One can argue that the result is better or
worse than that reached under pre-1985 law; it is impossible to argue
that it is not very different. Given the drastic differences between the
two constructions, Woodworth highlights the need to clarify the Cali-
fornia statute, before such misconceptions in dicta become misapplica-
tions of the law in general.
B. The Evolution of the Revised Probate Code
In an effort to clarify the state of the present law, the following
discussion tracks the changes in California law, which went from sim-
ple to complex, and describes some of the forces propelling those
changes. It concludes that, in spite of all the excess statutory baggage
now in the California Probate Code, the law has not changed much
after all.
(1) The Original Reform Proposals
In response to a 1980 charge by the California legislature,5 5 the
California Law Revision Commission (Commission) 56 tentatively rec-
ommended a new comprehensive statute governing wills and trusts in
1982. The proposed statute was partially based upon the 1969 version
of the Uniform Probate Code, and its stated goal was "to clarify and
simplify probate law, to carry out more effectively the testator's in-
tent, and to promote national uniformity of law."'57 The rules con-
54. Section 21114 succeeded section 6151, which was added during the Probate Code
reform of 1983.
55. Resolution Chapter 37, Statutes of 1980, reads: "Whether the California Probate
Code should be revised, including but not limited to whether California should adopt, in
whole or in part, the Uniform Probate Code." 1980 Cal. Stat. 5086.
56. The role of the California Law Revision Commission is to study topics assigned to
it by the California legislature and prepare recommendations for law reform. CAL- GOV'T
CODE §§ 8280-8281 (West 1992).
57. 16 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 2305, 2311 (1982).
cerning construction of wills were but a small part of the major and
comprehensive revision of the Code.58
As originally proposed, the statute did not depart significantly
from prior rules regarding the construction of wills. The anti-lapse
statute was revised to be more consistent with the 1969 version of the
Uniform Probate Code by the addition of a new section that saves a
failed residuary bequest by passing it to the other residuary benefi-
ciaries. Yet nothing in the originally proposed statute would change
the answer in our exercise above from that under pre-reform law. The
proposed statute did not change California's preference for vested
over contingent remainders. It did, however, include a provision codi-
fying the rule discussed above regarding delaying vesting where the
class designation is to "heirs," "descendants," or a similarly described
class. 59
58. 1983 Cal. Stat. 842 § 58.
59. In particular, the Commission's initial proposal contained the following suggested
provisions:
[§] 6143.
(a) A devisee who does not survive the testator does not take under the will.
(b) If it cannot be established by clear and convincing evidence that the devisee
has survived the testator, it is deemed that the devisee did not survive the
testator.
(c) Subdivision (b) does not apply if the testator's will contains language (1) deal-
ing explicitly with simultaneous deaths or deaths in a common disaster or (2)
requiring that the devisee survive the testator for a stated period in order to take
under the will.
[§] 6145. If a devisee who is kindred of the testator is dead at the time of execu-
tion of the will, fails to survive the testator, or is treated as if he or she prede-
ceased the testator, the issue of the deceased devisee who survive the testator
take in place of the deceased devisee and if they are all of the same degree of
kinship to the devisee they take equally, but if of unequal degree then those of
more remote degree take by representation. One who would have been a devisee
under a class gift if he or she had survived the testator is treated as a devisee for
the purposes of this section whether his or her death occurred before or after the
execution of the will.
[§] 6146. Except as provided in Section 6145:
(a) If a devise other than a residuary devise fails for any reason, the property
devised becomes a part of the residue.
(b) If the residue is devised to two or more persons and the share of one of the
residuary devisees fails for any reason, the share passes to the other residuary
devisee or to the other residuary devisees in proportion to their interests in the
residue.
[§] 6148. A testamentary disposition, whether directly or in trust, to the testator's
or another designated person's "heirs," "next of kin," "relatives," or "family," or
to "the persons entitled thereto under the intestate succession laws," or to per-
sons described by words of similar import, means "heirs" as defined in Section 44
determined as if the testator or other designated person were to die intestate at
the time when the testamentary disposition is to take effect in enjoyment.
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(2) The 1983 Legislation
For reasons that are unclear from the legislative history, the stat-
ute that the California legislature ultimately enacted in 1983 deviated
dramatically from the Commission's tentative recommendations. The
legislation drastically changed California law by moving from a system
that favored vested property interests to one that favored contingent
interests. In brief, the major changes wrought by the 1983 enactment
can be summarized as follows.
By far the most dramatic change was the addition of an implied
condition to require that the taker of a future interest survive until the
time the interest takes effect in enjoyment,60 and the extension of the
anti-lapse statute to kindred of the testator, thus avoiding the failure
of the future interest.61 No such survivorship condition existed in
prior law, which called for the vesting of future interests created by
will at the testator's death. Because those interests were vested, and
in most cases transmissible, the anti-lapse statute was not needed in
such a situation. Under the new rule established by the 1983 enact-
ment, a testamentary trust which provides "income to A for life, re-
mainder to B" no longer creates a vested transmissible remainder in
B. B's remainder is contingent upon survival until A's death, and if B
fails to survive, his remainder interest fails. If, however, B is 7's kin-
dred, then the anti-lapse statute would apply and B's issue can take in
B's place. Contrast this with the result under prior law: regardless of
the relationship between B and T, if B predeceases A, B's remainder
is an asset of his estate, and passes to the beneficiaries under his will at
his death (or to his heirs if he dies without a will). 62
Former code section 123,63 which merely codified the common
law rule of convenience for class gifts, was repealed and replaced with
section 61506 so that it would be consistent with the implied condition
of survivorship in the new section 6146. Thus, on its face, section 6150
allowed reduction in class membership through failure to survive until
[§] 6149. A person conceived before but born after a testator's death, or any other
period when a disposition to a class vests in right or possession, takes if answering
to the description of the class.
16 CAL. L. REviSIOo COMM'N REP. 2305, 2401-04 (1982).
60. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6146 (West 1983) (repealed 1994).
61. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6147 (West 1984) (repealed 1994).
62. Note that the common law future interests law would continue to apply to trusts
created inter vivos.
63. CAL. PROB. CODE § 123 (West 1956) (repealed 1983).
64. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6150 (West 1984) (repealed 1994).
the time of enjoyment.65 The Commission comment to the statute
notes that the issue of a deceased class member may take under the
anti-lapse statute.66
As was true in the original proposals, section 6151 expressly made
a gift to a class such as "heirs" subject to a requirement of survivor-
ship to the time of enjoyment.67 The legislative history describes this
as "a special application of, and.., consistent with, Section 6150.1168
The difference between the survivorship requirement applicable to
class gifts generally and one to "heirs" is described in the comment to
section 6151. It is noted there that the issue of a deceased class mem-
ber of a class gift who is kindred to the testator will take under the
anti-lapse statute, whereas the shares of members of an indefinite
class, such as "heirs," are not subject to the anti-lapse statute.69 The
comment also notes that the statute is new and that it was drawn from
the Pennsylvania statute.70 It is, in fact, consistent with the California
common law approach to such cases, and can be viewed as merely
codifying existing law, rather than effecting any change in the law.
Although sweeping and controversial, the statutes that the Cali-
fornia legislature enacted in 1983 were thoughtfully drafted. They
were internally consistent and meshed well. The anti-lapse statute was
expressly made applicable in cases where remainders failed because of
the implied survivorship requirement.71 It is also made clear that a
remainder to a deceased class member could be saved by the anti-
lapse statute.72 The revised statutes read as follows (and significant
variations from the proposed statute are marked by italics).
§ 6146. Devisees; failure to survive; future interests(a) A devisee who fails to survive the testator or until any future
time required by the will does not take under the will. For the pur-
poses of this subdivision, unless a contrary intention is indicated by
the will, a devisee of a future interest (including one in class gift form)
is required by the will to survive to the time when the devise is to take
effect in enjoyment.73
§ 6147. Devisee defined; taking by representation; contrary inten-
tion in will
65. Id.
66. 17 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 867, 874-75 (1984).
67. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6151 (West 1991) (repealed 1994) (current version at CAL.
PROB. CODE § 21114 (West Supp. 1997)).
68. 17 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 867, 874-76 (1984).
69. Id. at 876.
70. Id
71. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6147 (West 1983) (repealed 1994).
72. Id.
73. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6146(a) (West 1983) (repealed 1994).
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(a) As used in this section, "devisee" means a devisee who is kin-
dred of the testator or kindred of a surviving, deceased, or former
spouse of the testator.
(b) Subject to subdivision (c), if a devisee is dead when the will is
executed, or is treated as if he or she predeceased the testator, or
fails to survive the testator or until a future time required by the will,
the issue of the deceased devisee take in his or her place by repre-
sentation. A devisee under a class gift is a devisee for the purpose of
this subdivision unless his or her death occurred before the execution
of the will and that fact was known to the testator when the will was
executed.
(c) The issue of a deceased devisee do not take in his or her place if
the will expresses a contrary intention or a substitute disposition.
With respect to multiple devisees or a class of devisees, a contrary
intention or substitute disposition is not expressed by a devise to the
"surviving" devisees or to "the survivor or survivors" of them, or
words of similar import, unless one or more of the devisees had issue
living at the time of the execution of the will and that fact was known
to the testator when the will was executed.74
§ 6150. Devise to class; persons included
In the absence of a contrary provision in the will:
(a) A devise of a present interest to a class includes all persons an-
swering the class description at the testator's death.
(b) A devise of a future interest to a class includes all persons an-
swering the class description at the time the devise is to take effect
in enjoyment.
(c) A person conceived before but born after the testator's death or
time of enjoyment, as the case may be, takes if answering the class
description.7 5
§ 6151. Devise to heirs
Unless a contrary intention is indicated by the will, a devise of a
present or future interest to the testator's or another designated
person's "heirs," "next of kin," "relatives," or "family," or to "the
persons entitled thereto under the intestate succession laws," or to
persons described by words of similar import, is a devise to those
who would be the testator's or other designated person's heirs, their
identities and respective shares to be determined as if the testator or
other designated person were to die intestate at the time when the
devise is to take effect in enjoyment and according to the California
statutes of intestate succession in effect at that time.76
(3) The 1984 Amendments
Between the time of enactment in 1983 and the effective date of
the statute in 1985, the Commission changed its mind about the most
significant change made in 1983: the implied condition of survivorship
74. Id. § 6147.
75. Id. § 6150.
76. Id § 6151.
for future interests. 77 In 1984, the Commission recommended that the
statute be amended to delete the general survivorship requirement.78
To accomplish this, the Commission recommended the following
changes, which the California legislature enacted in 1984.
The second sentence of section 6146(a) was deleted, and section
6153, 79 restating the pre-reform rule that interests vest at the testator's
death, was added. The Commission comment states:
The second sentence of subdivision (a) formerly established a con-
structional preference in favor of contingent remainders (survivor-
ship required) rather than vested remainders (survivorship not
required). With the deletion of the second sentence from subdivi-
sion (a), the question of whether or not survivorship is required is to
be determined according to general rules of construction.80
The second sentence of section 6147(c) was deleted. The Commis-
sion's comment gives no explanation for this deletion.
Even though the change wrought by the 1983 legislation was so
great and was reflected throughout the statutes enacted at that time,
the 1984 revisions removing the 1983 changes were remarkably sparse.
The previously carefully crafted statutes were sloppily revised, leaving
internal inconsistencies and ambiguities where none existed before.
What else should have been done?
(a) Removal of "Future Tune" Language From Sections 6146 and 6147
Recall the wording of section 6146 prior to the 1984 amendment:
§ 6146. Devisees; failure to survive; future interests
(a) A devisee who fails to survive the testator or until any future
time required by the will does not take under the will. For the pur-
poses of this subdivision, unless a contrary intention is indicated by
the will, a devisee of a future interest (including one in class gift
form) is required by the will to survive to the time when the devise
is to take effect in enjoyment.81
The first part of the first sentence merely restated the pre-reform rule
that a deceased beneficiary of a will does not take. The language "or
until any future time required by the will" was added solely because of
the second sentence, which wrote into any will that did not expressly
77. See id. § 6146.
78. 18 CAt. L. REvisIoN COMM'N REP. 87 (1984).
79. California Probate Code section 6153 stated: "A testamentary disposition, includ-
ing a devise to a person on attaining majority, is presumed to vest at the testator's death."
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6153 (West 1991) (repealed 1994) (current version at CAL. PROB.
CODE § 21116 (West Supp. 1997)).
80. 18 CAL. L. REVisION COMM'N REP. 87 (1986) (citing CAL_ PROB. CODE §§ 6140,
6153 (West 1984) (repealed 1994)).
81. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6146(a) (West 1983) (repealed 1990).
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state otherwise, a condition that the taker of a future interest must
survive until the time that interest takes effect in enjoyment, in other
words, until the time the preceding interest ended. Yet in 1984, when
the Commission backed away from the survivorship condition and
recommended deletion of the second sentence, it left in place the "fu-
ture time" language in the first sentence. Similar "future time" lan-
guage remains in section 6147, which addresses the application of the
anti-lapse statute to an otherwise failed future interest. Yet in the ab-
sence of an implied survivorship condition, what can that "future
time" language possibly mean? Absolutely nothing! Yet there re-
mains a possible implication that section 6146 does still impose a survi-
vorship condition after the 1984 amendment. But this was clearly not
the result desired by the Commission, which intended to remove the
implied survivorship condition.
The "future time" language of sections 6146 and 6147 after the
1984 amendment can only conceivably have meaning in the context of
a will that expressly requires survival until some time other than the
testator's death. For example, a will may state, "I leave $10,000 to E if
he survives me by 30 days." Can meaning be given to the "future
time" language of sections 6146 and 6147 in the context of this type of
will provision? Absolutely not! Because the will expressly requires
survival until thirty days after the testator's death, the interest fails by
the terms of the will itself. Section 6146 adds nothing to the will itself.
Its predecessor, section 92,82 was needed to deal with a will that did
not require survival. In such a case, section 92 implied a condition of
survivorship. Section 92 had no application, nor did its successors,
section 6146 and now section 21109, when the will expressly imposed a
condition of survivorship. Then what about section 6147? Might
some meaning be given to the "future time" language in the context of
the anti-lapse statute? Again, absolutely not. It has long been the
rule in California, as in a majority of jurisdictions, that an express re-
quirement of survival negates application of the anti-lapse statute.8
So again, we are left with statutory words that are bereft of meaning.84
The only way to give any meaning to the "future time" language is to
imply a condition of survivorship. Yet the Commission comments to
82. CAl. PROB. CODE § 92 (West 1982) (repealed 1983).
83. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21110(b) (West Supp. 1997).
84. This would also be true in the case of a future interest expressly conditioned upon
survival. For example, suppose a will creates a trust that provides, "income to A for life,
remainder to E if E survives A." In such a case, Es remainder is expressly contingent, and
will revert to Y's estate if no alternate taker is named. Section 6146 adds nothing. Because
survival of A is expressly required, the anti-lapse statute of section 6147 will not apply.
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the 1984 amendment clearly state the intent to remove the survivor-
ship condition.8 5 The statute must be amended to remove the
ambiguity.
(b) Return Section 21113(b) to its Pre-Reform State
Whether survivorship until time of enjoyment is required for fu-
ture interests in class gift form, the situation illustrated in the exercise
posed above, remains unresolved. After the 1984 revision, section
6150(b) (now section 21113(b)) remained the same: "(b) A devise of a
future interest to a class includes all persons answering the class de-
scription at the time the devise is to take effect in enjoyment." 86 This
could easily be read to imply that the class does not include persons
not alive at the time of enjoyment. This was clearly how the Wood-
worth court read the statute.87 Yet I believe that the Commission in-
tended the 1984 amendment to eliminate all implied conditions of
survivorship, except in the narrow situation dealt with by section 6151,
a gift to a class such as "heirs." I base this conclusion on the com-
ments made by the Commission when section 6146 was added in 1983
and amended in 1984. In 1983, the Commission stated:
The first sentence of subdivision (a) of Section 6146 continues the
substance of the first portion of former Section 92. The second sen-
tence of subdivision (a) is new and establishes a constructional pref-
erence in favor of contingent remainders (survivorship required)
rather than vested remainders (survivorship not required). See gen-
erally 3 B. Witkin, Summary of California Law Real Property
§§ 246-259, at 1973-83 (8th ed. 1973). The second sentence thus
changes the result in cases such as Miller v. Oliver, 54 Cal. App. 495,
202 P. 168 (1921) (vested remainder included in remainderman's es-
tate notwithstanding her death before life tenant), and Estate of
Stanford, 49 Cal. 2d 120, 315 P.2d 681 (1957) (class gift to "child or
children" of income beneficiary on termination of trust held vested
and remainderman not required to survive income beneficiary), and
is consistent with Estate of Easter, 24 Cal. 2d 191, 148 P.2d 601(1944).8
85. The Commission stated:
The second sentence of subdivision (a) formerly established a constructional pref-
erence in favor of contingent remainders (survivorship required) rather than
vested remainders (survivorship not required). With the deletion of the second
sentence from subdivision (a), the question of whether or not survivorship is re-
quired is to be determined according to general rules of construction. See, e.g.,
§ 6140 (intention of testator). See also § 6153 (presumption that disposition vests
at testator's death).
18 CAL. L. REVISION COMm'N FdEP. 87 (1986).
86. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6150(b) (West 1991) (repealed 1994).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
88. 17 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N R-P. 875 (1984).
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This language, coupled with the Commission's 1984 comment8 9
when it removed (or attempted to remove) the survivorship condition
from section 6146, and added section 6153, leads me to conclude that
the Commission intended that future interests to classes, except those
described in section 6151, would vest at the testator's death. Yet after
the 1984 amendments, there is arguably an inconsistency between sec-
tions 6150(b) and 6153. To leave that inconsistency in place was inex-
cusable. The language of section 6150 should have been restored to
its pre-1983 state, eliminating the possibility of reduction in class
membership.
In spite of these substantial problems, the law as revised in 1984
became effective in 1985, and was reenacted without substantive
change in the next round of Probate Code reform in 1990. Although
no courts, other than Woodworth, have considered how the rules ap-
ply to future interests, cases on this issue will undoubtedly arise.
IlI. Expansion of the Rules to Govern "Instruments"
To make matters worse, in 1994, at the urging of the State Bar,
the legislature amended the rules described above to expand their ap-
plication. Whereas the construction provisions in sections 6146-6153
applied only to interests conveyed by will, the new statutes, renum-
bered sections 21109-21114, now apply to all donative transfers by "in-
strument," a term defined to include wills, trusts, and deeds. The
confusion and ambiguity inherent in the pre-1994 rules were com-
pounded exponentially by extension of their application to all
"instruments."
The Estate Planning, Trust and Probate Law Section of the State
Bar of California sponsored the 1994 legislation, ostensibly in order to
achieve consistency in the construction of wills and will substitutes.90
Although revocable living trusts have become increasingly popular in
California as a means of avoiding the probate of assets, anti-lapse stat-
utes and other rules of construction had not been made applicable to
them.91 To illustrate, suppose Tleaves his estate by will to A, without
stating how the estate should be distributed should A fail to survive
him. If A is kindred to T, the pre-1994 anti-lapse statute (section
6147) would imply a substitute gift to A's issue. If, however, T placed
his assets in a revocable living trust, reserving to himself the income
89. See supra note 80.
90. See Melitta Fleck, Should Rules of Construction of Wills be Applied to Living
Trusts?, Esr. PLAN. TR. & PROB. NEWS, Summer 1993, at 15, 15-16.
91. Ld.
for life, and directing that the trust be distributed to A upon his death,
he has accomplished an identical dispository scheme, while avoiding
probate of his assets. Nevertheless, under pre-1994 law, the result
would be very different should A fail to survive T, because section
6147 did not apply to revocable living trusts. Instead, courts have held
that A possessed a vested remainder in the trust from the time of its
creation, subject to divestment through revocation by T.92 The result:
the trust would pass to A's estate, and to his heirs. Although those
heirs might be A's issue, achieving the same result as the anti-lapse
statute, it is equally possible that the heirs might be A's spouse, or
another person whom T might or might not have intended to benefit.
It was this type of inconsistency that caused the State Bar of Cali-
fornia's Estate Planning, Trust and Probate Law Section to recom-
mend extending the anti-lapse statute, and other provisions of the
Probate Code, to revocable living trusts.93 For no apparent reason,
however, the recommended legislation that the California legislature
passed went far beyond what was necessary to achieve this reasonable
and probably advisable goal. As drafted, the statutes apply not only
to will substitutes, but to gifts and gift substitutes as well. This has
created a host of problems.
A. Outright Gifts by Deed or Other Instrument
The simplest example is perhaps the most dramatic. 0 wishes to
make a gift of Blackacre to A, and executes a deed conveying Black-
acre to A, in fee simple. Under section 21109, unless 0 has expressed
a contrary intention, A's right to Blackacre will not vest until O's
death, for it is conditioned upon A surviving 0. If A fails to survive
0, then the anti-lapse statute will pass Blackacre to A's issue, if A is
kindred to 0. If A is not kindred, or does not leave issue, then Black-
acre will revert to 0. Could the legislature have intended this result?
Perhaps more importantly, could 0 have intended this result? How
might 0 be able to express a contrary intention, so as to avoid section
21109? Drafting the deed to read "to A, even if she does not survive
me," should do the trick. Yet such language is hardly that used in the
normal drafting of deeds. A literal application of section 21109 would
recharacterize an irrevocable outright gift to A as something more
92. See e.g., Randall v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 119 P.2d 754, 755-57
(Cal. 1941); First Nat'l Bank v. Anthony, 557 A.2d 957, 959 (Me. 1989).
93. See Fleck, supra note 90, at 15-16; see generally Rochelle A. Smith, Note, Why
Limit a Good Thing? A Proposal to Apply the California Antilapse Statute to Revocable
Living Trusts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1391 (1992).
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akin to a life estate in A coupled with a contingent remainder in A or
A's issue, which will fail should A or A's issue fail to survive 0. This is
a patently absurd result, and one hopes that courts would strain
mightily to avoid a literal reading of section 21109.
The tax consequences of the gift to A under pre-1994 law are
straightforward. 0 has made a taxable gift of all of Blackacre to A.
When 0 dies, the property will not be a part of his gross estate for
federal estate tax purposes.94 One of the major estate tax benefits
sought through lifetime giving is the removal of post-gift appreciation
from the donor's estate. Where a gift is outright, this will invariably
be achieved. When A dies, the value of Blackacre will be included in
her taxable estate for federal estate tax purposes.95
If section 21109 is applied literally, it is much more difficult to
predict the tax consequences of the transfer under post-1994 law.
That section recharacterizes the transfer in a manner that departs
from standard estate planning practice; that is, no one would ever pur-
posely draft a deed in such a way. It is clear that the value of O's
reversionary interest must be taken into account in valuing the gift to
A. However, that value will be zero, if, as is apt to be the case, 0 and
A are members of the same family.96 It also appears clear that the
value of Blackacre, less the value of A's outstanding life estate, will be
included in O's estate if he dies during A's lifetime,97 thereby substan-
tially eliminating the benefit of a lifetime gift of the property. More-
over, if A should predecease 0 and A leaves no issue, the property
94. By transferring the property irrevocably during life, 0 has effectively removed
from his estate any appreciation in Blackacre between the time of the gift and the date of
his death, as well as any gift tax paid with the gift (unless he dies within three years of the
gift, in which case the gift tax paid will be added back to his estate). I.R.C. § 2035 (West
1997).
95. I.R.C. § 2033 (West 1997).
96. I.R.C. § 2702(a) (West 1997). If A and 0 are not members of the same family,
then the reversion must be valued under actuarial principles and subtracted in calculating
the amount of the gift.
97. Internal Revenue Code sections 2036 and 2037 bring into the gross estate lifetime
transfers that are essentially substitutes for testamentary dispositions. Under section 2037,
if a donee can only take possession or enjoyment of property by surviving the donor
(which is true of A's remainder interest), and if the donor has retained a reversionary
interest in the property with a value in excess of five percent of the value of the property,
then the donor is taxed at death as though the remainder interest in the property was never
given away by including the property, less the value of any outstanding income interests.
Even if the value of O's reversion is less than five percent, because of the possibility that 0
will possess or enjoy the property for a period not ascertainable without reference to his
death, section 2036 may bring the property back into his estate, less the value of A's out-
standing income interest. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (West 1997).
will revert to 0 and will be included in his estate on his subsequent
death.98
If A dies during O's lifetime, Blackacre will no longer be included
in A's estate. But if the property passes to A's issue because of the
anti-lapse statute, then that transfer will be subject to the tax on gen-
eration-skipping transfers.99
If applied literally, section 21109 drastically changes the estate
and gift tax consequences of lifetime gifts by "instruments." 100 This
creates an enormous trap into which countless donors (and their attor-
neys) could fall, for the only way to avoid application of section 21109
is to expressly negate a requirement of survival in the transfer instru-
ment. In the case of outright gifts, this is rarely, if ever, done.
The non-tax consequences are also dramatically changed.
Although the possibility of a reversion to 0 may be remote, A lacks
the power to dispose of a fee simple interest in the property by will so
long as 0 is alive. Yet A may view Blackacre as her own, and believe
that she has the power to dispose of it by will. She does not. Simi-
larly, sale of the property by A will be virtually impossible, given the
contingent nature of A's interest.
The effective date of the 1994 revisions raises another issue. Sec-
tion 21109 applies "to all instruments, regardless of when they were
executed."10' Consider A, who received a deed to Blackacre in 1993.
Suddenly, with the enactment of section 21109 in 1994, does A lose
her vested interest in Blackacre? This is an absurd result, which may
rise to the level of an unconstitutional taking.1°2
B. Irrevocable Gifts in Trust
Consider now how section 21109 would apply to a substitute for a
direct gift, an irrevocable trust. 0 leaves Blackacre in trust giving in-
come to A for life, remainder to B. Because of section 21109, B's
remainder interest is contingent on his survival of 0, although it will
98. I.R.C. § 2033 (West 1997).
99. I.R.C. § 2612(a) (West 1997). A's death would result in a "taxable termination"
under Internal Revenue Code section 2612(a). Even though the transfer was not in trust, it
would be treated as a trust for purposes of the statute. I.R.C. § 2652(b)(1) (West 1997). Of
course, if 0 had not used up his one million dollar exemption from the generation-skipping
transfer, then the transfer would not be subject to tax. See I.R.C. §§ 2631-2632 (West
1997). But if O's exemption were no longer available, then an immediate tax at the maxi-
mum estate tax rate of 55% would be imposed. See I.R.C. § 2641 (West 1997).
100. The absurdity is compounded when one considers that gifts of property that are
effected by delivery, such as corporate shares, are not subject to the rule.
101. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21140(a) (West Supp. 1997).
102. Dukeminier, supra note 38, at 165.
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pass to his issue if he is kindred to 0 or O's spouse. If B leaves no
issue, or if B leaves issue who fail to survive 0, the property will re-
vert to 0. If A dies during O's lifetime, what happens? Does the
property pass to B, subject to divestment if he predeceases 0 without
issue? Or does it pass back to 0 until his death, at which point it will
pass to B if he is still alive? The answer is unclear. What is clear is
that nobody would intentionally draft a trust in this manner.
As in the case of the outright gift of Blackacre, the transfer tax
consequences are dramatically different should section 21109
recharacterize B's remainder as contingent. Whereas under pre-1994
law 0 would have made a completed gift of the property by creation
of the trust, thereby removing post-gift appreciation from his estate,
under post-1994 law, O's reversionary interest will bring the property
back into his estate, less the value of A's and B's outstanding life es-
tates, should 0 predecease B.'03 Moreover, although under pre-1994
law the value of B's remainder will be included in his estate should he
predecease A, that will no longer be the case if his interest is contin-
gent.104 Yet, if the remainder interest passes to B's issue because of
the anti-lapse statute, then the result will be an imposition of the tax
on generation-skipping transfers at A's death. 0 5
Again, section 21109 creates a tax trap into which many estate
planners could fall. Relying on the long-standing rule that trusts, like
the one above, create a vested remainder in B, many will be shocked
to learn that they have unwittingly lost the estate tax advantage of
lifetime giving of the property and have incurred a generation-skip-
ping transfer tax where none was anticipated, and where estate tax
inclusion might very well have been desired.10 6
It is apparent that there is no justification whatsoever in imposing
a survivorship condition on inter vivos gifts, as section 21109 does, and
it is essential that section 21109 be amended to eliminate this problem.
In fact, there does not seem to be any reason to make the construction
rules of section 21110 applicable to anything but wills and will substi-
tutes. Thus, the statute should be amended to apply only to testamen-
103. I.R.C. §§ 2036-2037 (West 1997).
104. I.R.C. § 2033 (West 1997).
105. I.RC. § 2612(a) (West 1997). Again, this assumes that O's one million dollar gen-
eration-skipping transfer tax exemption has been exhausted. I.R.C. §§ 2631-2632 (West
1997).
106. Planners wishing to minimize transfer taxes on the trust must take into account a
wide variety of factors, including the amount of the trust, the identity of the trust benefi-
ciaries, the size of the beneficiary's estate, and the availability of the donor's one million
dollar exemption from the tax on generation-skipping transfers.
tary dispositions, which should be defined as those that take place at
the transferor's death either by will or by an instrument that remains
revocable until death. Under such a rule, consistency would be
achieved between the treatment of revocable trusts and wills, without
needlessly extending the rules to future interests or irrevocable inter
vivos transfers.
IV. Unneeded Reform
While California has not adopted a statutory replacement for the
common law rules of future interests, the UPC has with the addition
of section 2-707 in 1990. For those states considering adopting UPC
section 2-707, or some variation of it, it is worth discussing the inher-
ent problems in any statute which overrides long-standing common
law by rewriting a trust instrument. The merits of UPC section 2-707
have been the subject of a somewhat heated exchange in the Michigan
Law Review between Professors Dukeminier and Waggoner.10 7 In
this section, I weigh in on the controversy on the side of Professor
Dukeminier.
UPC section 2-707 rewrites a trust instrument that fails to explic-
itly state whether or not a remainder beneficiary is required to survive
until the time of possession. The model adopted, though not precisely
followed, is the anti-lapse model: it presumes that the testator would
have wanted (i) the beneficiary's issue to take should the beneficiary
not survive until the time of possession, and (ii) if the beneficiary died
without issue, all of the deceased beneficiary's interest to terminate.
Thus, O's trust that reads "Income to A for life, remainder to B" is
rewritten by the statute to read "Income to A for life, remainder to B
if B survives A, and if not, then to B's issue, and if none, then to the
residuary beneficiaries of O's will, and if none, then to O's heirs."
Professors Halbach and Waggoner have declared that the stan-
dard to be applied in evaluating UPC section 2-707 is "whether it ad-
vances the law by giving a satisfactory result in a greater proportion of
cases than the law it replaces and whether it does so with a minimum
of litigation."'01 8 They argue that this standard is met. I disagree both
with their standard and with their conclusion that it has been met.
I have serious objections to UPC section 2-707, and join Professor
Dukeminier in his criticisms of it. My primary objection is that UPC
107. See Dukeminier, supra note 38; Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Probate
Code Extends Antilapse-Type Protection to Poorly Drafted Trusts, 94 MicH. L. RFv. 2309
(1996).
108. Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 3, at 1149.
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section 2-707 represents a drastic change in the law of future interests;
indeed it does "upend" the law of future interests, without sufficient
justification. Professor Waggoner minimizes the statute's import, by
stating that it only applies to poorly drafted instruments. 09 But
whether the result of poor draftsmanship or not, a remainder interest
that is transmissible is vastly different from one that is contingent, and
a statute which overturns long-standing common law and converts
transmissible remainders into contingent ones should have to meet a
higher standard than that offered by Professors Waggoner and
Halbach.
In addition, even if the standard for evaluating the statute should
be that offered by Professors Halbach and Waggoner, I do not believe
it is clear that UPC section 2-707 meets that standard. UPC section 2-
707 is touted as the solution to the three main disadvantages of trans-
missible remainders: (1) inclusion in the beneficiary's gross estate for
federal estate tax purposes; (2) tracing through the probate estate of
the deceased beneficiary; and (3) the possibility of diverting the re-
mainder outside the bloodline of the creator of the trust. As discussed
below, I believe that problem (1) is overstated, that (2) could be sub-
stantially mitigated in a much less dramatic and complex fashion, and
I question whether (3) is a serious problem in the first place.
I do not doubt that all of the illustrious practitioners and academ-
ics who participated in the drafting of UPC section 2-707110 believe in
the worth of the endeavor. But I do believe that they were overzeal-
ous. They have created an enormously complex, cumbersome statute
which effects a dramatic change in the law, and have failed to demon-
strate that the statute is necessary or that the results it achieves are
appropriate.
A. UPC Section 2-707 Dramatically Changes the Nature of Future
Interests
In defense of UPC section 2-707, Professor Waggoner states as
follows:
First and foremost, the predeceased beneficiary of a transmissible
future interest can only transmit a future interest, not a present in-
terest. The recipient cannot derive much pleasure from a future in-
terest until it ripens into possession. The recipient cannot use it for
investment or consumption. The recipient cannot even hang it on
the wall or place it on the coffee table and admire its beauty. A
future interest is of minimal financial (or aesthetic) value until the
109. Waggoner, supra note 107, at 2310.
110. See Waggoner, supra note 107, at 2337-38.
distribution date, i.e., until the trust is dissolved and the corpus is
actually distributed."'
I find this to be a most remarkable misstatement of economic
reality. Obviously, while delay in the time of possession impacts an
interest's value, it in no way nullifies it. Changing that interest to one
contingent on survival, which is what UPC section 2-707 will do, has a
far more significant effect on the interest's value.
Consider Ellen, a remainder beneficiary of a trust created by her
deceased father. The trust, drafted sloppily, states "income to my
spouse, remainder to my children." The income beneficiary is Ellen's
mother; the remainder passes to Ellen and her siblings. Ellen is un-
able to have children. She is married (or has a non-marital partner).
If she survives her mother by as little as one week, she WIl have the
ability to leave her interest in the trust to her husband (or partner).
Yet if she predeceases her mother by the same margin, her share of
the trust will go entirely to her siblings. This is the result caused by
UPC section 2-707, and I find it troubling. If Ellen's interest is trans-
missible, it absolutely has significant value, even if, as Professor Wag-
goner stated, she can't put it on her coffee table. She and her husband
can (and will) take it into account in planning their lives. I am dubi-
ous of Professor Waggoner's minimization of the impact of UPC sec-
tion 2-707 in this circumstance. What compelling concerns dictate in
favor of a statutory alternative to the common law result in this case?
B. The Estate Tax Problem
If Ellen's interest is contingent on surviving her mother, it will
not be included in her estate for federal estate tax purposes. This is
true. However, if it is included in her estate, it will not be subject to
current tax if she leaves it to her husband.112 Even if she leaves it to
her non-marital partner, it will not result in estate tax liability unless
its value, combined with the value of Ellen's other assets, exceeds
$600,000 (or even greater amounts under current legislative propos-
als). 1" 3 If, however, it passes to her siblings because of operation of
UPC section 2-707, it will be taxed in their estates on their later deaths
(or on the deaths of their spouses). Thus, in the case of a single gener-
111. Id. at 2329-30.
112. I.R.C. § 2056 (West 1997).
113. See, e.g., S. 2, introduced January 21, 1997, which would increase the effective
exemption to $1,000,000. More recently, the Clinton Administration's budget agreement
with congressional Republicans calls for a doubling of the unified credit to an exemption
equivalent of $1,200,000. See Richard W. Stevenson, After Years of Wrangling, Accord is
Reached on Plan to Balance Budget by 2002, N.Y. TIMEs, May 3, 1997, §1, at 1.
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ation class gift such as this one, when a remainder beneficiary dies
without issue, there is at best estate tax deferral when the interest
lapses." 4
If Ellen did have children, so that UPC section 2-707 operated to
pass her remainder interest to them at their grandmother's death, then
the effect of UPC section 2-707 is to substitute the tax on generation-
skipping transfers for estate tax inclusion. Distribution of the trust to
Ellen's issue at the time of her mother's death would be a "taxable
termination.11 5 This result could be preferable to estate tax inclusion
in Ellen's estate, under specific circumstances. First, one would have
to assume that Ellen would not have left the interest to her spouse,
and that the interest is sufficiently valuable and her taxable estate is
sufficiently large that the estate tax burden at her death would be sig-
nificant. In those circumstances, avoidance of the estate tax could be
preferable, because the tax on generation-skipping transfers would be
deferred until the time of the taxable termination, i.e., the death of
Ellen's mother. In addition, some or all of Ellen's father's one million
dollar exemption from the tax on generation-skipping transfers might
be available to shelter the interest from tax.116 Nevertheless, if the tax
on generation-skipping transfers did apply, it would be imposed at the
maximum federal estate tax rate of fifty-five percent.117 And if Ellen's
mother died shortly after her, the deferral benefit could well be out-
weighed by the larger amount of tax.
Professor Waggoner dismisses UPC section 2-707's substitution of
generation-skipping tax for estate tax inclusion as insignificant, be-
cause it will only apply to poorly drafted trusts, and few poorly drafted
trusts will exceed the one million dollar exemption from the tax on
generation-skipping transfers."" To the extent that this argument has
merit, it would equally apply to dilute the estate tax "problem" of
transmissible remainders, even if the current legislative proposals to
increase the unified credit against estate tax are not passed." 9 Profes-
sor Waggoner describes the "momentum" in the scholarly literature
114. However, if Ellen died childless and intestate, so that under the common law rule
the trust passed to her siblings, then the UPC result would be better, because the property
would not be taxed in both the siblings' estate and Ellen's estate. This, of course, assumes
that the estates of Ellen and her siblings exceed the exemption equivalent from estate
taxes.
115. I.R.C. § 2612(a) (West 1997).
116. I.R.C. § 2631 (West 1997).
117. I.R.C. § 2641 (West 1997).
118. Waggoner, supra note 107, at 2345.
119. See sources cited supra note 113.
for a statute like UPC section 2-707, citing articles dating back to 1951
criticizing the ale of early vesting.120 Yet the transfer tax landscape
has altered dramatically and fundamentally in the last fifteen years
with the enactment of the unlimited marital deduction, 12' increase in
the unified credit to an exemption equivalent to $600,000,122 the en-
actment of the tax on generation-skipping transfers, and the current
proposals to limit application of the estate tax even further. It is obvi-
ous that the estate tax problem perceived by those early writers no
longer exists for most trust beneficiaries, and that for sufficiently afflu-
ent ones, it is far more complex than represented by Professor Wag-
goner and is hardly solved by UPC section 2-707. Affluent
beneficiaries might benefit from a reduction in estate taxes, while less
affluent ones (the most likely victims of sloppy draftsmanship) are
robbed of the full value of their remainder interests.
C. The Problem of Probating the Remainder
Probably the greatest current problem with transmissible remain-
ders is the need to identify the persons entitled to the remainder when
the life tenant dies. Using the example above, when Ellen's mother
dies, the trustee will have to determine to whom the interest should
pass under Ellen's will, or who her heirs are if she died intestate. If an
heir or will beneficiary also predeceased Ellen's mother, then the in-
terest would have to be traced through their estates. This clearly
could become a cumbersome process, and is avoided by UPC section
2-707.123 Yet is this problem sufficiently serious to justify a fundamen-
tal change in the nature of Ellen's interest? I think not.
The process of probating the remainder may be costly. Yet it is
not necessarily true that the remainder will be subject to probate ad-
ministration in the deceased beneficiary's estate. Professor
Dukeminier notes that re-opening a deceased beneficiary's estate may
rarely be necessary because most forms for decrees of final distribu-
tion contain an omnibus clause including later discovered assets.124 In
addition, some courts have expressly directed distribution to the per-
sons entitled thereto. 25 UPC section 2-707 may in fact subject the
remainder to supervision of the probate court in more cases than the
120. Waggoner, supra note 107, at 2321-22.
121. I.R.C. § 2056 (West 1997).
122. I.R.C. § 2010 (West 1997).
123. Waggoner, supra note 107, at 2328.
124. Dukeminier, supra note 38, at 161-62.
125. Md at 162.
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common law: if the deceased beneficiary left minor issue, their shares
will have to be administered through a guardianship. 126 On the other
hand, the beneficiary of a transmissible remainder has the ability to
leave the property in trust for his minor children. Thus, UPC section
2-707 by no means guarantees that the remainder interest will not be
subject to administration by the probate court.
To the extent that there is concern about the costs of probating
transmissible remainders, a far less drastic solution would be a statute
authorizing a trustee to distribute the interest of a deceased remainder
beneficiary directly to the persons entitled to the interest under the
beneficiary's will, or to her heirs if she died without a will.127 While
not eliminating the problem of tracing, this solution would largely mit-
igate the probate cost concern, without the dramatic change in the
nature of the beneficiary's interest.
D. Passing Property Outside the Bloodline
UPC section 2-707 evidences a bizarre, almost feudal belief that
there is some inherent evil in the possibility that a remainder interest
might pass outside the bloodline of the settlor of a trust, and that only
remainder beneficiaries with children are entitled to enjoy the full
value of their remainder interests. Indeed, Professor Waggoner as-
serts that the elimination of the possibility that property may pass
outside the settlor's bloodline is the goal of most well-drafted trusts.128
As evidence of the inadequacy of the common law rule favoring
vested interests, Professor Waggoner cites cases in which a finding
that a remainder was transmissible resulted in distribution of a portion
of a trust to someone unrelated to the settlor. In In re Krooss,129
under facts more complicated but not significantly different from the
Ellen trust described above, the trust share of a daughter who prede-
ceased her mother passed to the daughter's husband. Who is to say
that this is a bad result? Was the surviving brother more deserving
than the husband? How are we to know? The brother's share was not
126. Professor Waggoner identified this as a problem with the Illinois statute in 1969,
noting that it will often be the case that minor children will take the interest, because when
a legatee of a future interest dies prior to the time of possession, it is frequently because he
died at a young age. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Future Interests Legislation Implied Condi-
tions of Survivorship and Substitutionary Gifts under the New Illinois "Anti-lapse" Provi-
sion, 1969 U. ILL_ L.F. 423, 437-38 (1969).
127. This was suggested by Professor Dukeminier. See Dukeminier, supra note 38, at
162.
128. Waggoner, supra note 107, at 2310.
129. 99 N.E.2d 222 (N.Y. 1951).
eliminated; he simply did not receive his sister's share. The father was
apparently content that his daughter could do with the interest as she
wished if she survived her mother. 130 If her father was concerned
about the trust passing outside the bloodline, he could have further
limited her interest in the trust, rather than giving it to her absolutely
on her mother's death. Yet the only expressed intention in the trust is
that she should receive it absolutely on her mother's death.13' This
demonstrates his intent that his daughter receive a valuable, if future,
interest in the property. What purpose is served in taking that interest
away?
If the ultimate goal of the law of wills and trusts is to effectuate
the testator's intent, then there is no reason to believe that the solu-
tion offered by UPC section 2-707 is any more likely to achieve that
goal than is the common law. There is no consensus on the critical
question of what the settlor's intent is when the instrument creating
the trust fails to require survival. All that is known from the face of
the instrument is that no alternative taker was named. Again using
the Ellen trust example, while it may be that Ellen's father never con-
templated that she would die before her mother, it is equally plausible
that the issue was discussed, and the attorney drafted the instrument
as she did because she knew what the result would be under common
law: the remainder would pass to Ellen's estate. While this may not
be artful estate planning, it very well may express the father's intent
that the property was to be disposed of by Ellen, whether she died
before or after her mother. Simply because the cumulative experience
of the illustrious estate planners who sit on the Joint Editorial Board
for the Uniform Probate Code 32 would indicate that most clients
would not want Ellen to enjoy the full value of a transmissible remain-
der interest unless she chose or was able to have children, I do not
believe the law should attribute that same prejudice to Ellen's father
where there is no indication in the instrument that he shared it.
Given the lack of certainty over the extent of the problems which
UPC section 2-707 purports to solve, the fact that it may create new
problems, and the total lack of consensus over the appropriate means
of distributing property, the area of transmissible future interests
seems hardly ripe for reform. In fact, UPC section 2-707 seems
130. In In re Krooss, the settlor had specified that if the daughter died with descend-
ants the interest should pass to them, but he did not specify what should happen if the
daughter died without descendants, as she did. Id. at 223.
131. IM.
132. See Waggoner, supra note 107, at 2337-38.
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largely indefensible. It is essential to recall in considering reform pro-
posals that the legislature is not writing on a blank slate. Perhaps if
this were the dawn of time, a statutory rule disposing of remainder
interests might be preferable to a common law rule giving the remain-
der to the deceased beneficiary's estate. Yet this is not the dawn of
time; there is a well-developed body of common law which has dealt
effectively, if not optimally, with the problem posed. The applicable
standard for evaluating a proposal to overturn that body of law should
be higher than when starting from scratch. Does the reform proposal
reach a significantly better result than the common law? Clearly UPC
section 2-707 does not.
Conclusion
In order to eliminate the ambiguities left behind in the 1984 legis-
lation, the California Probate Code must be revised. Absent such a
revision, there is the distinct possibility that a court might wrongly
interpret the Code to impose a survivorship condition on gifts of fu-
ture interests. Woodworth illustrates that the possibility is not at all
remote.
Also apparent is the fact that the 1994 revisions of the Code went
well beyond those necessary to extend the rules of construction appli-
cable to wills and will substitutes. The statute must be amended to
make it applicable only to transfers, by will or trust, that take place
upon the transferor's death.
All states should approach the survivorship provisions of the 1990
version of the UPC with caution. Legislatures should not overturn
long-standing common law rules and rewrite instruments, particularly
attorney-drawn ones, without some compelling justification. Future
interests are rarely created in home-drawn instruments. It is the attor-
ney's role to discern the transferor's intent and to express it clearly
and unambiguously in the instrument. When the attorney fails to do
so, the common law takes the instrument as drafted and allows the
beneficiary to dictate the disposition of the remainder. The UPC (and
other statutes in the anti-lapse model) add words to the instrument
that dramatically change the nature of the interests transferred. In
spite of the lack of any empirical evidence of transferor preference,
the UPC rewrites a trust in a way equally likely to frustrate the testa-
tor's intent as to carry it out. What justification then might be served
by UPC section 2-707? The rule seems more likely to protect incom-
petent attorneys than a testator's intent, and that purpose should not
form the normative foundation for a statute that rewrites trust instru-
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ments in a way that could potentially frustrate the testator's intent,
and impose even greater transfer tax burdens and administrative
costs.
